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NOTES
BRECHT V AB	 SON: HARD
JUSTICE FOR STATE PRISONERS?
On April I, 1975, the defendant, a former police officer, kid-
napped a 16 year-old girl while she was waiting to pick up her school-
teacher mother.' At gunpoint, he handcuffed the girl and took her to
his home, with the intention of raping her.' After noticing the young
girl looking around the house, as if she were trying to memorize every
detail, the defendant took the young girl to a secluded spot and fatally
shot her in the head with a .357 pistol." The defendant left the girl's
body where it fell and drove to the outskirts of the town, where he
abandoned the girl's car on the highway, hazard lights flashing, and
hitchhiked to town.4
During the defendant's trial for capital murder, the State intro-
duced expert testimony indicating that the victim had bruises on her
wrists from handcuffs and that a .357 bullet killed her.' Other testi-
mony showed that the defendant possessed handcuffs with traces of
blood of the same type as the victim's.° The State also introduced
testimony of witnesses that linked the defendant to the area near the
abandoned car. In addition, the State introduced a witness that tes-
tified that the defendant sexually assaulted her in a secluded area at
gunpoint in 1975. 7 Finally, in closing arguments, the State made refer-
ence to the defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the defen-
dant's testimony that he killed the victim accidentally.
'Vanderbilt v. Collins, 994 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1993). The facts presented arc partially





6 Vanderbilt, 994 F.2d at 191.
/d. at 193.
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The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. On
appeal, the defendant claimed that reference to his post-Miranda si-
lence was a constitutional error requiring reversal. The appellate court
set aside the conviction, holding that the State failed to prove that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The state supreme
court reversed, concluding that the error was harmless. The defendant
petitioned for habeas review in the federal district court, reasserting
his claim that the error required reversal of his conviction.
The proper harmless error standard that the federal court should
apply is a question that the United States Supreme Court only recently
resolved. 8 Prior to 1993, the federal court would likely have applied
the same harmless error standard on habeas review as applied by the
state courts on direct review' Thus, it is unpredictable how the federal
court would judge the impact of the error. This partially fictional fact
pattern, however, reflects real case examples and continues to arouse
societal concern over judicial deference to state criminals:° This con-
cern is particularly salient in today's high crime era." Accordingly,
societal demand for finality of convictions grows stronger. 12 In contrast,
legal commentators criticize the United States Supreme Court's appar-
ent efforts to promote the finality of judgments and principles of
federalism by limiting the availability of collateral review and broaden-
ing the application of harmless error." Consistent with commentators'
observations, harmless error analysis and federal habeas corpus histori-
cally evolved in different directions: harmless error experienced ex-
pansive application in the twentieth century: 4 while federal habeas
"Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993).
9 See Yates v. Evett, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991) (Chapman harmless error applied on habeas
review of constitutional error); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 579 (1986) (Chapman harmless
error applied on habeas review of constitutional error); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, '24
(1967) ("harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" harmless error standard adopted on direct review
of constitutional error).
1 ') See Lisa S. Spickler, Casenote, Brecht v. Abrahamson: Another Step Toward Evisceration of
Habeas Carpus, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 549, 550 (1993).
" FBI, Crime in the U.S., 1989 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 71. According to reports by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, law enforcement agencies made an estimated 14.3 million arrests
in 1989 nationwide for all criminal infractions except traffic violations. Id. Over a five year period,
1985-1989, total offenses increased 14%; total violent crimes increased 34%; and property crime
arrests increased 13%. Id. For the decade, 1980-1989, arrests for all offenses increased 28%;
violent arrests increased 35%; and property crime arrests increased 15%. Id.
12 See Spickler, supra note 10, at 549.
13 1d. at 549-50; see alsoJ. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to
Federalism; the Burden for Defense Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. REV. 291, 291-92
(1992).
14 See infra notes 29-103 and accompanying text.
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corpus was progressively limited.' 5 Although these doctrines are gener-
ally addressed independently, the United States Supreme Court faced
these doctrines simultaneously in 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, when
it addressed the question of which harmless error standard to apply
on federal habeas review of constitutional error. 16
In Brecht, the Court held that a state prisoner must prove that a
constitutional error substantially influenced the jury's verdict in order
to reverse a conviction on habeas review. 17 Prior to this decision, a
conviction warranted reversal if the state failed to prove that the con-
stitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., there
was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the convic-
tion. 18 The Brecht Court emphasized the policies of finality and feder-
alism underlying collateral review and adopted the more lenient "sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence" requirement for federal
habeas proceedings. 19 Although commentators and members of the
Court itself predict an exponential decline in the cases of federal
habeas relief at the expense of upholding the "truth,"" the Brecht
Court, as well as society, 21 asserts the importance of finality of state
judgments and the different role of federal habeas re-view.22
This Note examines the Brecht decision in light of the history and
underlying policies of federal habeas review and harmless error analy-
sis and challenges commentators' strong criticisms. Section I examines
the historical development of harmless error analysis." Section II ex-
amines the history of federal habeas corpus. 24 Section III discusses two
United States Supreme Court cases that address both harmless error
and habeas review simultaneously." Section IV sets out a detailed analysis
of Brecht v. Abrahamson. 2° Section V discusses commentators' criticisms
of Brecht v. Abrahamson." Finally,.Section VI tests the merits of corn-
13 See infra notes 104-69 and accompanying text.
16 113 S. Ct. at 1713-14,1719.
17 Id. at 1714,1722.
18 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967).
13 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22.
"See Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50; see also Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1730 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
21 See Spickler, supra note 10, at 549.
22 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720,1721.
23 See infra notes 29-103 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 104-69 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 170-94 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 195-329 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 330-69 and accompanying text.
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mentators' criticisms and analyzes the potential impact of the Brecht
Court's decision on society and future habeas litigation."
I.. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE: AN
EXPANSION FROM NONCnNSTITUTIONAL ERROR TO CONSTITUTIONAL
ERROR
The harmless error rule has deep roots in American jurispru-
dence." Early American courts adopted the automatic reversal rule
from their English ancestors which required automatic reversal follow-
ing even the most technical error at trial." This automatic reversal rule
spurred societal demand for some type of harmless error review." In
an attempt to discourage reversals, Congress established a harmless
error rule in 1919,32
 now embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 52(a)." According to commentators, the underlying rationale
for the harmless error rule was to foster economies and judicial efficiency
by avoiding reversal of convictions for small errors or defects that had
little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial." Thus, the
harmless error rule allowed courts to look beyond the mere existence
of a procedural error and determine whether the error had any bear-
ing on the merits of the case and on the jury's verdict." By
 1967, all
50 states had adopted some form of harmless error rule." Initial
"See infra notes 370-403 and accompanying text
29 See Charles J. Ogletree, jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Ham of Applying
Harmless Error to Carted Confessions, 105 HARV. L. Rev. 152, 156 (1991); see also ROBERT J.
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3 (1970) (disc'tssion of history of harmless error
rule in English and American jurisprudence).
3° See, e.g., Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402, 402, 403 (1871) (reversed because indictment stated
that offense was "against the peace of the State" instead of "against the peace and dignity of the
State"); TRArNOR, supra note 29, at 3 (citing People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345 (18F3) (reversing a
robbery con icdon because indictment failed to state that pn ?erty did not belong to defen-
dant)).
51 Ogletree, Jupra note 29, at 156.
32 /d at n.37 (citing Act of Februa7y 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Slat. 1181). The current version is
codified fa 2i4 U.S.C. § 2111 (1989) which states: "[Oln the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give ;,.idgment after an crimination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) ...tates that "(alny error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights should be disregaide0." Id.
34 Ogletree, supra note 29, at 157.
35 id.
" Id.; see Chapman v. California, $86 U.S. 18, 22
	 (stating th7t. Larn-L.-ss error statutes
or rules were present in every state and that ConE-ess had establishei that. such errors should
not result in a judgment reversal).
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Supreme Court held that federal cOurts -hiivethe power and duty to
provide the remedy of release for Abase .'deprived of their freedom
without due process, despite procedural default incurred by the peti-
tioner during state proceedings. 120 Fay arose out of a murder trial in
which the State admitted the defendant's coerced st4emenis. 121 Al-
though the defendant failed to object to the actmissibil4 of big state-
ments at trial, he later petitioned for federal habeas review on the
ground that it was reversible error to convict him on the basis of his
coerced confessiond" The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of, •New York dismissed the-defendant's application for
habeas reviewtand: the defendant appealed.'" The United States Court
of Appeals forr.theSeventh "Circuit reversed and ordered the conviction
set aside.'" --. •
The United States Supreme Court granted habeas review and
concluded that the peti6oner's failure to appeal his murder conviction
within the statd'system did not deny him access to federal courts under
habeas review.'" The Court reasoned that notions of, finality alone
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal Liberty- are mot:to be denied-without
full opportunity for plenary judicial review.'" Moreover, the Court held
that forfeiture of remedies does not warrant the unconstitutional con-
duct by whin a, conviction may be obtained.' 27
 Thus, commentators
argue, the Court significantly expanded the availability of habeas relief
by holding that federal courts may grant habeas relief on a federal
claim which could not be heard on direct review because of procedural
default.'"
Gases, 61 UMKeL. Rev. 599;602 (1993); jarerSeiberg, The Great Writ Wronged? Exlio.icer Weighs
in amid Local Brdwl over ildheasitorpus Reform, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, Ltit 1.
up Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27, 438 (1963). The Court did, however, grant federal judges
the discretion to deny relief where a petitioner has deliberately sought to stiliverrch'evde:Orclerly
adjudication of federal defenses in the state courts.' Id. at 1433,
121
 Id. at :395=6.	 I.
• 
I22 Noia v. Fay,1 183 K Supp.:r2t, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 	 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd,
372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963),
	 ".
123 1.'9, 183 F.'Supp. at 227.
	 •
124 Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345; 3E11961), affd, 372'i1.8., 391 (1963).
125 Fay, 372 U.S. at 426.
126 /d. at 424. The Court noted tigt.
 there was respectable common law authority for the
proposition that'etbag 4.46 avail ;Ábie!to remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to
federal law. Id. at405.
127 1d. at 428.
I28 Danici, supra note 119, at 602; Seiberg, supra note 119.
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mentators' criticisms and analyzes the potential impact of the Brecht
Court's decision on society and future habeas litigation. 28
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE: AN
EXPANSION FROM NONCONSTITUTIONAL ERROR TO CONSTITUTIONAL
ERROR
The harmless error rule has deep roots in American jurispru-
dence.2° Early American courts adopted the automatic reversal rule
from their English ancestors which required automatic reversal follow-
ing even the most technical error at trial." This automatic reversal rule
spurred societal demand for some type of harmless error review. 8 ' In
an attempt to discourage reversals, Congress established a harmless
error rule in 1919, 32 now embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 52(a). 33 According to commentators, the underlying rationale
for the harmless error rule was to foster economies and judicial efficiency
by avoiding reversal of convictions for small errors or defects that had
little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial. 34 Thus, the
harmless error rule allowed courts to look beyond the mere existence
of a procedural error and determine whether the error had any bear-
ing on the merits of the case and on the jury's verdict. 35 By 1967, all
50 states had adopted some form of harmless error rule. 36 Initial
25 See infra notes 3701403 and accompanying text.
29 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HA RV. L. REV. 152, 156 (1991); see also ROBERT J.
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3 (1970) (discussion of history of harmless error
rule in English and American jurisprudence).
341 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402, 402, 403 (1871) (reversed because indictment stated
that offense was "against the peace of the State" instead of "against the peace and dignity of the
State"); TISAYNOR, supra note 29, at 3 (citing People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345 (1863) (reversing a
robbery conviction because indictment failed to state that property did not belong to defen-
dant)).
51 Ogletree, supra note 29, at 156.
32 Id, at n.37 (citing Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181). The current version is
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988) which states: "[Oln the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
55 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) states that "Wily error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights should be disregarded." Id.
m Ogletree, supra note 29, at 157.
55 1d.
56 Id.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (stating that harmless error statutes
or rules were present in every state and that Congress had established that such errors should
not result in a judgment reversal).
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application of harmless error, however, was limited to cases involving
nonconstitutional error."
A. Harmless Nonconstitutional Error: Kotteakos v. United States 38
The United States Supreme Court first applied federal harmless
error rules to cases involving nonconstitutional error." In 1946, in
Kotteakos v. United States, the United States Supreme Court applied the
harmless error rule and held that the standard for determining non-
constitutional harmless error is whether the error had a "substantial
and injurious effect or influence" in determining the jury's verdict."
In Kotteakos, the United States District Court for the District of Illinois
convicted the defendants of a single general conspiracy based on
evidence proving, not one, but eight or more conspiracies of the same
type executed through a common key figure." The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions." The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and concluded that
the admission of the additional conspiracies substantially influenced
the jury and that, consequently, the error was not harmless."
In adopting the substantial injury standard, the Court reasoned
that the primary goat of nonconstitutional harmless error analysis is to
substitute judgment for automatic application of rules." The Court
further reasoned that this substitution is necessary in order to balance
the need to protect against arbitrary action and essential unfairness
with the need to prevent abusive use of procedural loopholes when
fairly convicted." The Court specifically acknowledged that such an
"Ogletree, supra note 29, at 157; see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)
(example of case involving nonconstitutional error).
sm 328 U.S. at 750.
39 Ogletree, supra note 29, at 157; see Kotleakos, 328 U.S. at 765, 776.
4° Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 775, 776.
41 Id, at 752. The conspiracy charge alleged that the defendants had sought to induce various
financial institutions to grant credit upon applications containing false and fraudulent informa-
tion. Id. The prosecution established proof of the conspiracy charge against each defendant
through proof of several conspiracies. Id. at 755. The indictment, however, charged each defen-
dant with only a single conspiracy. Id. at 755. The several conspiracies presented all related to
Simon Brown, who pleaded guilty and was the common and key figure in all illegal transactions
proven. Id. at 753, 754-55. The participants in the different conspiracies were, on the whole,
except for Brown, different persons who did not know or have anything to do with one another.
Id. at 754,
42
 United States v. Lekacus, 151 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd sub nom. United States v.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
43 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 750, 765, 771, 776.
44 Id. at 760.
45 Id.
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analysis is fact specific and should be applied to the entire record."
The Court further stated that the harmless error inquiry does not rely
on whether the jury was right in their judgment, regardless of the error
or its effect upon the verdict.47 Rather, the Court stated that the pri-
mary focus is what effect the error actually had or is reasonably con-
sidered to have had on the jury's decision." Thus, the Court held that
if the reviewing court could not state with reasonable certainty that the
judgment was not substantially influenced by the error, it is impossible
to conclude that substantial rights were not affected."
B. Harmless Constitutional Error: Chapman v. California5°
Although Kotteakos reserved application of harmless error analysis
to nonconstitutional error, the United States Supreme Court, over
twenty years later, applied the harmless error rule to constitutional
erronm In 1967, in Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme
Court held that the standard for determining whether a conviction
must be set aside is whether the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt." In Chapman, the State's attorney, prosecuting defendants
on charges of burglary, kidnapping, and murder, commented upon
the defendants' refusal to testify at trial and made inferences to the
jury of their guilt therefrom." The jury found the defendants guilty of
all charges.54 On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the court
admitted that the petitioners had been denied their Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination by the prosecution's comments on their
elected silence.55 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the lower court's
46 Id. at 762, 764.
47 Id. at 764.
48 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
49 Id. at 764-65.
5° Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
51 Id. at 22.
52 Id. at 24.
53 Id. at 18-19. The State's attorney relied on Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution
to comment upon the defendant's refusal to testify at trial. Id at 19. Article I, § 13 provides in
relevant part that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
CAL. CONST. art I, § 13.
54 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18-19.
55 People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 196, 197 (1965), rev 'd sub nom. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). Prior to the defendants' appeal, the United States Supreme Court in 1965,
in Griffin v. California, held Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution invalid on the ground
that it placed a penalty on the exercise of an individual's right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 380 U.S.
609, 613, 615 (1965) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid comments by prosecution on
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conviction after applying the California Constitution's harmless error
provision, which forbids reversal unless the court concludes that the
error complained of resulted from a miscarriage of justice. 56
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,
holding that a federal constitutional error may only be considered
harmless when the state proves that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." The Chapman Court placed the burden of proving
harmless error on the beneficiary of the error." Specifically, the Court
required the State to prove that there was no reasonable possibility that
the prosecutor's actions might have contributed to the conviction for
the error to be held harmless." The Court affirmatively refused to
adopt the petitioner's argument that all federal constitutional errors
must always be regarded as harmful, requiring reversal." The Court
emphasized, however, that some constitutional rights are so basic to a
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.°
Justice Black, writing for the majority, set out the opinion in four
steps. 62
 First, the Court stated that where a federal right is violated,
federal law, rather than state law, should apply." Second, the Court
stated that, in some cases, some constitutional errors are so unimpor-
tant that they may be deemed harmless.64 Justice Black reasoned that
such a rule prevents small or uninfluential errors at trial from serving
as a basis for reversa1. 65
 Third, the Court preferred the federal harmless
error rule over state harmless error rules.66 Finally, in applying the
harmless error rule to the facts of the case, the Court reasoned that
accused's silence and by court that silence is evidence of guilt). This became known as a Califin
error.
Teale, 63 Cal. 2d at 197; see CAL. Cons'''. art. VI, § 4 1/2. Section 4 1/2 states in pertinent
part:
No judgment shall he set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence,
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or ter any error as to any matter of
procedure, unless after examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.
CAL. Coma. art. VI, § 4 1/2.
57 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20, 24.
58 id. at 24.
55 /d. at 23 (citing Faimy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)).
w Id. at 21-22.
nt Id. at 23, The Court cited three instances of error that can never be held harmless: I)
coerced confession; 2) right to counsel; and 3) impartiality ol' a judge. Id. at 23 n.B.
62 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-26.
63 See id. at 21.
64
 Id. at 22.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 23-24.
1110	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:1103
the prosecution's reference to the defendants' silence and decision not
to testify could be no more considered harmless than the introduction
against a defendant of a coerced confession. 67
 Thus, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the automatic reversal principle and sanc-
tioned application of the harmless error rule to constitutional error. 6s
C. Post-Chapman Harmless Error: An Expansion of Constitutional
Harmless Error
During the post-Chapman era, state and federal courts adopted
the principle that all constitutional error is not harmful error, and
thus, applied the harmless error rule to a variety of constitutional
errors."'' In 1969, in Harrington v. California, the United States Su-
preme Court reaffirmed Chapman and held that a conviction will be
maintained if the evidence is so "overwhelming" that the constitutional
violation was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."7° Harrington arose
out of a murder trial of four men in which one defendant was impli-
cated in the murder by two co-defendants. 7 ' The trial court admitted
the co-defendants' confessions although they refused to take the stand,
and thus, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confron-
tation.72
 On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion on the grounds that the defendant's own confession sustained the
finding of guilt, irrespective of the co-defendants' confessions." The
California Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a re-
hearing." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."
In determining whether the error was harmless, the Court focused
on the duplicative or cumulative nature of the excluded evidence. 76
The Court analyzed whether the properly admitted evidence tended
to prove the same case as the erroneously admitted evidence.'' The
67 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24-26.
See id. at 22.
69 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246,1264 (1991) (coerced confession); United
States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499,508 (1983) (Griffin error),
7')
 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,254 (1969).
71
 Id. at 252-53.
72 Id. at 252.
"People c. Bosby, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159,163 (Cal, Ct. App. 1967), affd sub -nom. Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
7 ' 1
 Harrington, 395 U.S. at 252.
75 Id. at 252,254.
76 Id. at 254.
77 Id. at 253-54.
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Harrington Court concluded that the properly admitted evidence was
so "overwhelming" that the admission of the co-defendants' confes-
sions, although erroneous, was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."78
Thus, consistent with Chapman, the Court held that a Sixth Amend-
ment violation does not require reversal if the evidence is so over-
whelming that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
In 1983, in United States v. Hastings, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle expressed in Chapman, that all consti-
tutional errors do not require reversa1. 8" The Hastings Court held that
a reviewing court may not avoid harmless error analysis by asserting its
supervisory power as a justification for reversal of criminal convie-
tions.8 ' In Hastings, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois convicted the defendants of kidnapping, transport-
ing women across state lines for immoral purposes and conspiracy to
commit those offenses. 82
 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the defendants' conviction because
the prosecutor referred to defendants' failures to testify at trial in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 84
In faulting the Seventh Circuit for failing to apply harmless error
analysis, the Supreme Court reasoned that the reviewing court has a
duty to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, including most constitutional
violations." The Court justified this duty on the grounds that conser-
vation of judicial resources and the prompt administration of justice
required that reviewing courts remain unburdened by inconsequential
error. 8" The Court further stated that a conviction should be affirmed
if the reviewing court concludes that, on the whole record, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 87
 Thus, the Hastings Court
714 Id. at 254.
79 See Harrington, 359 U.S. at 252, 254.
HH See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 508-419 (1983).
HI Id. at 505.
" Id. at 501-03.
143
 United States v. Hastings, 600 F,2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981), reu'd, 461 U.S. 499, 512 (1983).
In Griffin a. California, the Curl held that prosecutorial comment on the failure of the accused
to testify at trial violates the tlefendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
380 U.S. 600, 613, 615 (1965).
84 Hastings, 461 U.S. at 500, 512.
85 14. at 509.
Hl'
87 Id. at 509 n.7.
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reaffirmed Chapman and held that such an error does not require
automatic reversal."
Commentators argue that the expansion of harmless error analysis
culminated in 1991, in Arizona v. Fulminante. 89 In Fulminante, the
United States Supreme Court held that an appellate court must apply
harmless error analysis to all constitutional trial errors and must up-
hold a conviction if the court deems the error to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." In Fulminante, the State obtained a conviction
based on a coerced confession in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 9 ' In determining that harmless error analysis
should apply, the Court divided errors into two types: trial error and
structural defects.92 The Court defined trial errors as errors in the trial
process occurring in the presentation of the case to the jury." The
Court reasoned that errors of this type are subject to harmless error
analysis because they can be quantitatively assessed." Alternatively, the
Court defined structural defects as errors that require automatic rever-
sal because they affect the framework and conduct of the trial."
Conversely, in a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, faulted the majority for failing
to follow the consistent line of authority which prohibits use of a
defendant's coerced confession against him at trial." Justice White
argued that, in addition to the untrustworthy nature of coerced con-
fessions, admission of such evidence is forbidden because it offends
the principles underlying the United States adversarial system: a system
that requires the state to establish guilt by evidence "independently
and freely secured" and not from the defendant's own mouth. 97 Thus,
the Fulminante dissenters expressed concern over the potential effects
of the majority's expansive application of harmless error analysis on
the American judicial system. 98 Nevertheless, commentators note that
88
 See id. at 508-09, 512.
89 See Karina Pergament, Arizona v. Fulminante: Romancing Coerced Confessions, 69 DENY. U.
L. REV. 153, 166 (1992); .iason Cenicola, Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: Accusation or Inqui-
sition?, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 383, 383 (1992).
99 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).
91 /d. at 1251.
92 1d. at 1264, 1265.
93 /d. at 1264.
94 id.
95 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265. The Court cited several instances of error that can never
he considered harmless: 1) right to counsel; 2) impartiality of judge; 3) right to self-repre-
sentation; 4) right to public trial; 5) unlawful exclusion of members of defendant's race from
grand jury. Id. at 1265.
96 Id. at 1257 (White, j., dissenting).
•'7 Id. at 1256 (White, j„ dissenting).
98 See id. (WM te, j., dissenting).
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the Fulminante majority's holding significantly expanded the scope of
constitutional harmless error analysis."
In sum, the Court continued to generally apply the "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to evaluate the effect of consti-
tutional error following the Chapman decision. 10° Concurrently, the
Court adopted and reaffirmed the principle that all constitutional
errors do not require reversal.'°' In Fulminante, the Court created
separate categories of errors and declared all trial type errors subject
to harmless error analysis.m The Fulminante Court, however, distin-
guished structural errors and held this category of error subject to
automatic reversal. 10"
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
Similar to the harmless error rule, the writ of habeas corpus
originated in English common law and was received into American law
in the colonial period.'" American courts adopted the writ as a proce-
dural safeguard for personal liberty.'" For most of American history,
however, collateral review was quite limited. 10° For example, the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue
writs only when persons were held in federal custody. 1 ° 7 It was not until
1867 that Congress passed the Judiciary Act which gave both federal
and state prisoners the opportunity to challenge their confinement in
federal court.'"
99 See Pergament, supra note 89, at 166; Cenicola, supra note 89, at 383.
100 See, e.g., Fulminante, 111 S. CL at 1265; Hastings, 461 U.S. at 508-09; Harrington, 395 U.S.
at 253-54,
1 ° 1 See, e.g., Fulminante, 111 S. CL at 1264-65; Hastings, 461 U.S. at 509.
1 °2 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65.
103 See id. at 1264.
104 Fay v. Nola, 372 US. 391, 400 (1963). Habeas corpus was given explicit recognition in the
federal Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "The principles of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
1 °5 William J. Sheds, Nonretroactioity on Habeas Corpus: Whittling at the Great Writ, 24 Sup-Forx
U. L. REV. 744, 745 (1990).
1116 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991), al/1d, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1723
(1993).
1 °7 1d. at 1372. Section 14 of the judiciary Act provides in relevant part: "Either of the justices
of the Supreme Court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have the power to grant writs
of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-1631 (1988)). In Ex parte Dorr, the
United States Supreme Court, construing the Judiciary Act, held that the federal common law
writ of habeas corpus did not extend to state prisoners. 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1845); see also Fay v.
Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963).
108 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991); see Federal Habeas Corpus
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Early application of the Judiciary Act confined the reach of federal
courts to questions of jurisdiction over prisoners by trial courts. 109
Accordingly, in 1915, in Frank v. Mangum, the United States Supreme
Court denied a writ of habeas corpus because the state court had given
the case full review within its jurisdiction." 0
 Thus, under Frank, habeas
relief was not available to state prisoners if the state tribunal had
proper jurisdiction, regardless of how egregious the trial error." Fed-
eral courts, therefore, deferred to state court judgments and did not
review state decisions even for reasonableness." 2
The United States Supreme Court finally abandoned this limita-
tion in 1942 in Waley v. Johnston." 3 In Waley, the Court abandoned the
fiction of the jurisdictional limitation and expressly acknowledged that
the writ was available to consider constitutional claims as well as ques-
tions of jurisdiction."4
Although scholars argue that Waley dramatically expanded federal
courts' habeas jurisdiction, 115
 it was not until 1953, in Brown v. Allen,
that the United States Supreme Court first sanctioned the application
of habeas corpus to state adjudications of federal law." 6 In Brown, the
Court rejected the principle of absolute deference to state judgments
and held that federal constitutional challenges raised by state prisoners
were cognizable on federal habeas review." 7 Thus, after Brown, even if
the claim had been fully and fairly adjudicated by the state judiciary,
the federal habeas court could redetermine it. 18
A. Expansion of Federal Habeas Corpus: Fay v. Noia
According to commentators, the breadth of federal habeas review
reached its height in 1963, in Fay v. Noia. 119 In Fay, the United States
Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1988)).
Section 2254(a) provides: 'The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation .
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United Slates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
1119 See Brecht v. Abrahmson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991).
11°Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915).
111 Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1372.
112 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2487 (1992).
113 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104, 105 (1942); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 495 (1963).
114 Watey,—, 316 U.S. at 104-05.
116 See Bator, supra note 113, at 495; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1372 (7th
Cir. 1991).
116 See Wright, 112 S. CL at 2486-87; Shells, supra note 105, at 749-50.
117 See Wright, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 449 (1953)).
118 See Sheils, supra note 105, at 749-50.
119 Kris Teena Daniel, Note, Sawyer v. Whitley: The Deadly Game of Procedures in Death Penalty
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Supreme Court held that federal courts have the power and duty to
provide the remedy of release for those deprived of their freedom
without due process, despite procedural default incurred by the peti-
tioner during state proceedings.' 2° Fay arose out of a murder trial in
which the State admitted the defendant's coerced statements."' Al-
though the defendant failed to object to the admissibility of his state-
ments at trial, he later petitioned for federal habeas review on the
ground that it was reversible error to convict him on the basis of his
coerced confession. 122 The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York dismissed the defendant's application for
habeas review and the defendant appealed: 23 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the conviction
set aside."4
The United States Supreme Court granted habeas review and
concluded that the petitioner's failure to appeal his murder conviction
within the state system did not deny him access to federal courts under
habeas review.'" The Court reasoned that notions of finality alone
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal liberty are not to be denied without
full opportunity for plenary judicial review. 126 Moreover, the Court held
that forfeiture of remedies does not warrant the unconstitutional con-
duct by which a conviction may be obtained. 127 Thus, commentators
argue, the Court significantly expanded the availability of habeas relief
by holding that federal courts may grant habeas relief on a federal
claim which could not be heard on direct review because of procedural
default.'"
Cases, 61 UMEC L. Ri:v. 599, 602 (1993); jaret Seiberg, The Great Writ Wronged? Ex -Boxer Weighs
in amid Local Brawl over Habeas Corpus Reform, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE, Nov, 15, 1993, at 1,
infra), v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27, 438 (1963). The Court did, however, grant federal judges
the discretion to deny relief where a petitioner has deliberately sought to subvert or evade orderly
adjudication of federal defenses in the state courts. Id. at 433.
121 Id, at 395-96.
122 Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222, 226 (S.D,N,Y, 1960), reo'd, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1961), affd,
372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
123Fay, 183 .E Supp. at 227.
124 Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 365 (1961), alp, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
125 Fay, 372 U.S. at 426,
I 28 /d. at 424. The Court noted that there was respectable common law authority for the
proposition that habeas was available to remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to
federal law. Id. at 405.
127 Id. at 428.
128 Daniel, supra note 119, at 602; Seiberg, supra note 119.
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B. Cutbacks on Federal Habeas Corpus
The expansion of habeas corpus, however, was short-lived.' 29 In
1976, in Stone v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that a
state prisoner is not entitled to habeas relief where evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial, if the
state provided a "full" and "fair" opportunity to assert the violation
during the state proceedings.'" In so holding, the Court recognized
that it was limiting the scope of federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
violations.'"
In Stone, petitioners sought habeas relief after exhausting state
procedures to remedy the admissibility of evidence obtained from
an allegedly unlawful search and seizure at tria1. 132 In determining
whether federal habeas review should remain available for Fourth
Amendment claims, the Court employed a cost-benefit analysis.' 33 The
Court reasoned that the benefit of deterrence offered by habeas review
was minimal as compared with the costs.'" In a footnote, the Court
stated that resort to habeas review on a nonconstitutional claim, such
as the exclusionary rule, intrudes on important values of American
government, including the efficient use of judicial resources, finality
in criminal proceedings, and federalism.'" Thus, the Court held that
state prisoners are not entitled to habeas review if provided a full and
fair opportunity to litigate their Fourth Amendment claims in the state
system."6
Moreover, commentators argue that the United States Supreme
Court took a further step toward narrowing availability of habeas re-
view one year after Stone.' 37 In 1977, in Wainwright v. Sykes, the United
States Supreme Court held that a state procedural default would pre-
vent federal review unless the defendant could demonstrate both ex-
129 S:eiberg, supra note 119.
13° Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 494 (1976).
131 Id. at 494.
132 1d. at 470, 472-73.
133 Id. at 489.
134 Id. at 493. The Court noted that the incremental deterrence that might occur from the
availability of the remedy during habeas proceedings is remote and speculative. Id. at 493.
Alternatively, the Court articulated the numerous costs of habeas review for Fourth Amendment
claims, including: deflection of the truth-finding process; diversion from the central question of
guilt or innocence; and the exclusion of relevant evidence. Id. at 490.
12/5 Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
1311 1d. at 482, 494.
137 Seiberg, supra note 119.
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ternal cause and actual prejudice resulting from the procedural de-
fault, or could establish the necessity of review to prevent a fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice.'" In Sykes, the defendant failed to make a
timely objection to the admissibility of his inculpatory statements as
required under Florida law."' The state courts denied defendant's
claim that he did not make a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights
prior to his inculpatory statements.'" Thereafter, the defendant peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for habeas relief."'
In denying habeas review, the Court adopted a "cause" and "preju-
dice" test.'" The Court reasoned that Fay v. Noia accorded too little
respect to state procedure."' In contrast, the Court declared that the
"cause" and "prejudice" test gave greater respect to state rules and
afforded an adequate guarantee that federal habeas courts will not be
barred from hearing claims involving an actual miscarriage ofjustice. 144
In applying this test, the Court denied defendant's habeas petition on
two grounds."' First, the defendant failed to explain his failure to
object to the admission of his statements at trial."f Second, the defen-
dant failed to demonstrate either cause or actual prejudice.'" Thus,
the Court held that a state procedural default will prevent federal
habeas review unless the defendant demonstrates cause and actual
prejudice from the default. 1 '8 Consequently, at least one commentator
notes that the Sykes holding evidenced a retreat from the expansive
language of Fay. 149
In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court held
that federal habeas courts may not retroactively apply new rules of
criminal procedure.' 50 In Teague, an all-white jury convicted the peti-
tioner, a black man, of attempted murder, armed robbery and aggra-
vated battery.''' The Court rejected petitioner's request that the Court
Im Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,87,90-91 (1977).
I" See id. at 86-87.
14"Id. at 75.
141 Id. at 74.
142 1d. at 87,90-91.
143 See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
144 Id. at 90-91.
Lir' Id. at 91.
146 id.
147 Id.
145 44es, 433 U.S. at 87.
145 Seiberg, supra note 119,
155 'reague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,310 (1989).
151 Id. at 292-93. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecution used all ten of
its peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors. Id. at 293. Consequently, petitioner motioned
1Or a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Id.
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adopt a new rule of criminal procedure by applying the Sixth Amend-
ment's fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury. 152 The Court
distinguished direct and collateral review and reasoned that new rules
of criminal procedure should generally not apply retroactively to cases
on collateral review.'" The Court stated that application of constitu-
tional rules not in existence at the time a conviction becomes final
would seriously undermine notions of comity and finality, principles
which are primary in determining the proper scope of habeas review.'"
Thus, the Court adopted a general rule of nonretroactivity for cases
on collateral review.' 55
Finally, in 1991, in Coleman v. Thompson, the United States Su-
preme Court overruled Fay v. Noia and further restricted access to the
writ of habeas corpus.'" Consistent with Sykes, the Coleman Court held
that federal habeas courts generally may not review a state court's
denial of a prisoner's constitutional claim if the state court's decision
was based on an independent and adequate state procedural default.'"
In Coleman, after petitioner was convicted of capital murder, a state
habeas court ruled against him on numerous federal constitutional
claims that he failed to raise on direct appeal. 15" Subsequently, peti-
tioner sought federal habeas review after his state appeal was dismissed
on the ground that notice of the appeal was untimely.'" In barring
Coleman's claim for federal habeas review, the Court reasoned that
comity and federalism concerns require that states' interests and com-
petency be respected by federal courts.'" Thus, the Court asserted that
states must have the first opportunity to correct their own mistakes. 16 '
The Court preserved, however, a litigant's access to federal habeas
review under certain circumstances.'" The Court stated that if the
petitioner shows "cause" for the default and that actual "prejudice"
resulted from the abuse of federal law, the petitioner may have access
152 1d. at 299.
153 1d. 305-06 (citing Mackay v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan,_]., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)).
151 See id. at 305-06 (citing Mackay, 401 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
155 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
15(1 See Coleman v. Thompson, I 1 1 S. Ct. 2546, 2564-65 (1991).
157 1d. at 2565.
1511 Id. at 2552.
159 Id. at 2552-53. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that,
by virtue of the dismissal of petitioner's state habeas appeal, petitioner had procedurally defaulted
his federal claims. Id. at 2553.
111° Id. at 2554-55, 2568.
1131 Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at '2555.
1132 Id. at 2565.
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to federal habeas review.' 53 In the alternative, the Court stated that if
the petitioner can show that a miscarriage of justice will result if his
claim is barred, federal habeas review may be granted.'" Thus, the
Court held that federal habeas review is barred in all cases in which a
state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims pursuant to an inde-
pendent. and adequate state procedural rule, unless the petitioner can
demonstrate "cause" and "prejudice."'" 5
The Court in Brown v. Allen and Fay v. Noia rejected the principle
of absolute deference to state judgments and provided state prisoners
with access to federal habeas review to judge the reasonableness of state
court decisions."'" This access, according to the Court in Fay, was
essential to preserve litigants' full opportunity for plenary judicial
review. 1 G 7 In Sykes, Stone, Teague and Coleman, however, the Court carved
out exceptions to full plenary review, and thus, limited litigants' access
to federal habeas corpus review.'° In creating these exceptions, the
Court relied on principles of finality and federalism to justify the
limited access."
III. APPLICATION OF HARMLESS ERROR IN FEDERAL HABEAS
PROCEEDINGS: ROSE AND VATES 17°
Although the harmless error and habeas corpus doctrines devel-
oped separately,' 71 the United States Supreme Court faced these doc-
trines simultaneously on two occasions.' 72 Although neither case spe-
cifically raised the question of the appropriate harmless error analysis
to be applied on federal habeas review of constitutional error, the
Court applied the Chapman standard in both controversies."' Under
Chapman, the State must prove that a constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid reversal of a conviction.' 74 Prior to
151
151
11111 Id. The Court also held that an attorney's error causing default on habeas review does
not prove "cause," because a prisoner Mies not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue
an appeal in state habeas pniceedings. Id. at 2568.
166 Wright v, West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2486-87 (1992) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953)); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426, 438 (1963).
167 F ay, 372 U.S. at 424.
1141 See supra notes 129-65 and accompanying text.
162 See, supra notes 129-65 and accompanying text.
17"eates v. Evert, I 11 S. Ct. 1884 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
171 See supra notes 129-69 and accompanying text.
172 See Yates, I l 1 S. Ct. at 1884; Role, 478 U.S. at 570.
173 See Yates, Ill S. et, at 1892; Rose, 478 U.S. at 578-79.
174 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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Rose v. Clark and Yates v. Evett, state and federal courts applied Chap-
man harmless error analysis on direct review only. 175 Although the
United States Supreme Court applied Chapman harmless error analysis
on federal habeas review in Rose and Yates, the Court's holding in both
cases narrowly addressed whether harmless error should even apply to
the particular error.' 78
First, in 1986, in Rose v. Clark, the United States Supreme Court
on federal habeas review held that harmless error analysis is strongly
presumed to apply where a defendant was represented by counsel and
tried before an impartial adjudicator.'" In Rose, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that it was the defendant's burden to disprove mal-
ice on his first and second degree murder charges. 178 The defendant
petitioned for writ of habeas review to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee on the ground that the unconsti-
tutional burden-shifting instruction was reversible error.' 79 The district
court granted habeas review and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.'" The United States Supreme Court
granted habeas review to determine whether an unconstitutional bur-
den-shifting instruction at trial could ever be harmless error.t 81
In deciding this question, the Rose Court reasoned that while there
are some errors to which harmless error does not apply, they are the
exception and not the rule.' 82 Moreover, the Court noted that the
harmless error doctrine recognizes that the central purpose of a crimi-
nal trial is to decide the factual question of guilt or innocence, and
thus, the focus is on the underlying fairness of the trial and not the
presence of an immaterial error.' 83 The Court emphasized, however,
that such an analysis requires a consideration of the entire record
before a conviction may be reversed. 184 Having decided that harmless
175
 See, e.g., Arizona v, Fulminante, I 1 1 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) (applied Chapman harmless
error standard on direct review); United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (same);
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969) (same); Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (harmless
error standard applied on direct review).
' 76 See Yates, Ill S. Ct. at 1892; Rose, 478 U.S. 582; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct.
1710, 1718 (1993) (proper harmless error standard on habeas review addressed for the first time).
177
 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 570 (1986).
178 Id. at 574.
179 Clark v. Rose, 611 F. Stipp. 294, '295 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), affd, 762 F.2d 1006 (fith Cir.
1985) (unpublished opinion), vacated, 478 U.S. 570, 584 (1986).
188 Rose v. Clark, 762 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1985) (unpublished opinion), vacated, 4713 U.S. 570,
584 (1986).
181 Rose, 478 U.S. at 572.
182 Id. at 578.
114-1 Id. at 577.
184 Id. at 583.
September 1994)	 HARD JUSTICE	 1121
error should apply to the unconstitutional burden-shifting error, the
Court stated that Chapman harmless error analysis, as the existing
federal harmless error standard, should be used to determine the
effect of the error.'" Thus, the Court held that challenged jury instruc-
tions are to be reviewed under the "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard.'"
Consistent with Rose, in 1991, in Yates v. Evett, the United States
Supreme Court on federal habeas review held that a challenge to
constitutionally erroneous jury instructions would be evaluated under
the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard articulated in
Chapman.'" In Yates, the trial judge instructed the jury to presume
malice from the use of a deadly weapon in violation of the Due Process
Clause.'" Having concluded that the instructions were constitutionally
erroneous, the Court followed Rose and stated that the effect of the
instructions was subject to review under Chapman: 89 The Court em-
phasized that the primary issue for the reviewing court is whether
the jury rested its verdict on the presumed fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. 19" In applying the harmless error rule, the Court held that the
erroneous burden-shifting jury instructions were not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt:9 '
Although both Rose and Yates involved application of the Chapman
standard to constitutional trial errors on habeas review, neither case
specifically addressed the question of the proper harmless error stand-
ard to be employed. 192 Rather, the United States Supreme Court held,
in both cases, that harmless error analysis applies to unconstitutional
burden-shifting jury instructions.' In Brecht v. Abrahamson, however,
the United States Supreme Court squarely addressed for the first time
the question of the proper harmless error standard to apply on habeas
review of constitutional error.'''
18.5
	 at 579-80, 582.
186 Rose, 478 U.S. at 582.
1" Yates v. Evett, 1 l 1 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991).
188 1d. at 1891.
189 See id. at 1892.
19° Id. at 1893. The Yates Court !Lulled the Supreme Court. of South Carolina because they
failed to apply the Chapman test as formulated. Id. at 1894. Rather, the South Carolina court.
sought merely to determine whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury could have
found it unnecessary to rely on the unconstitutional presumption to maintain a conviction, id,
at 1894,
191 Id. at 1897.
192 Yates,111 S. Ct, at 1892; Rose, 478 U.S. 578-79; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct., 1710,
1718 (1993) (proper harmless error standard on habeas review addressed for the first time).
191 Yates, 111 S. Ct. at 1892; Rose, 478 U.S. at 570-80, 582.
1114 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718.
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IV. ABANDONMENT OF THE CHAPMAN STANDARD ON COLLATERAL
REVIEW: BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON195
In 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the United States Supreme Court
readopted the Kotteakos standard and held that federal habeas relief
may only be granted where constitutional trial error had a "substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 196
In Brecht, the State made reference to the defendant's post-Miranda
silence at defendant's first degree murder trial in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [hereinafter "Doyle er-
ror" or "Doyle"] .'97 In determining the appropriate harmless error stand-
ard to apply to the controversy, the Brecht Court emphasized that the
federal habeas statute is silent as to the applicable standard. 198 As such,
the Court asserted that it is for the judiciary to determine what harm-
less error standard should apply on collateral review of a federal habeas
claim.'"° Employing a cost-benefit analysis, the Court distinguished
collateral and direct review in federal habeas cases of constitutional
error, and reasoned that the Kotteakos standard is better tailored to the
nature and purpose of collateral review than the Chapman standard."°
Moreover, the Court reasoned that Kotteakos' harmless error analysis
is less onerous and better promotes the considerations underlying
federal habeas jurisprudence."' Accordingly, the Court held that fed-
eral habeas relief is warranted only where constitutional error had a
substantial influence on the jury's decision. 02
Petitioner, Todd A. Brecht, was released from a Georgia prison to
the custody of his sister and her husband, Molly and Roger Hartman,
after being convicted of felony theft."' After his release, Mr. Brecht
resided with the Hartmans at their home in Wisconsin before entering
a halfway house."' During this period of time, Mr. Brecht's behavior
caused considerable tension between him and Mr. Hartinan. 205 Shortly
1 "113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
196 Id. at 1722.
197 rd. at 1717. In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the state may not undermine
the implications of the Miranda warnings by using a suspect's right to silence against him or her
at trial to imply guilt. 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
198
 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718.
1 • 9 Id. at 1719.
2"' Id. at 1719-22.
201
 Id. at 1722.
202 Id.
2"4 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714.
204 Id.
"Id. Mr. Hartman, a local district attorney, disapproved of Mr. Brecht's heavy drinking and
homosexual activities, as well as his past criminal behavior. Id. Accordingly, Mr. Hartman explicitly
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after his arrival, Mr. Brecht, after drinking, fatally shot Mr. Hartman in
the back while shooting cans with a rifle in the backyard. 200 After the
shooting, Mr. Brecht fled the scene.'"
After fleeing, Mr. Brecht drove the decedent's car into a ditch. 208
When a police officer stopped to offer assistance, Mr. Brecht informed
him that his sister was aware that his car was stuck and she had called
a tow truck. 2°9 After he hitched a ride to Wiona, Minnesota, the Min-
nesota police took him into custody. 21 ° After being informed that he
was being held for the shooting of Mr. Hartman, Mr. Brecht. replied
that "it was a big mistake" and asked to talk with "somebody that would
understand [hin]."'" The Minnesota police returned Mr. Brecht to
Wisconsin."' At his arraignment, Mr. Brecht received his Miranda
warnings and was charged with first degree murder."'
At trial in the Circuit Court for Buffalo County, the defendant, Mr.
Brecht, testified that he shot Mr. Hartman accidentally. 214 During cross-
examination and over the objections of defense counsel, the State
asked the defendant whether he told anyone prior to trial that the
shooting was accidental, to which the defendant replied, "No."215 The
State offered evidence of defendant's motive, as well as extrinsic evi-
dence tending to contradict the defendant's story. 2 t 5 During closing
arguments, the State argued that the defendant's testimony was under-
mined by the fact that he failed to secure assistance for Mr. Hartman,
fled the scene immediately after the shooting, and lied to the police
officer who offered him assistance when he was stuck in the ditch.'"
Further, the State argued that the petitioner had failed to mention
anything about the shooting being an accident to either the officer
prohibited Mr. Brecht from drinking and engaging in homosexual activities while residing in his
home. Id.
206 Id.
21)7 Id. Mr. Brecht fled the scene in Mrs. Hartman's vehicle. Id.





2 " Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714.
214 Id. The petitioner testified that the gun discharged when he fell while running toward
the stairs to replace the gun in an upstairs room where he found it. Id. Petitioner further testified
that he left the scene in Mrs. Harunan's car because he panicked when he saw Mr. Hartman at
his neighbor's door. Id.
212 Id. at 1715.
2111 1d. The State offered extrinsic evidence regarding the path the bullet traveled through
Mr. Hartman's body (horizontal to slightly downward) and the lociilion where the rifle was found
after the shooting (outside). Id.
217 1d. at 1714.
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that found him in the ditch, the man who gave him a ride to Wiona,
or the officers who arrested him. 218 Finally, the State made several
references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence. 219
 The jury found the
petitioner guilty of first degree murder and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment. 220
 The defendant appealed on the ground that the
State's reference to his post-Miranda silence at trial was reversible
error. 221
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the
ground that the State's reference to the petitioner's post-Miranda
silence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversa1. 222 The State of
Wisconsin sought review of this reversa1.225
 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court agreed that the State's use of the defendant's post-Miranda
silence constituted a Doyle error, but reinstated the conviction on the
ground that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chap-
man.224 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the State's im-
proper reference to the defendant's post-Miranda silence was infre-
quent and that the State's evidence of guilt was substantia1. 225
The defendant then filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin,
claiming that the State's reference to his post-Miranda silence consti-
tuted reversible error. 226
 The district court set aside the conviction
and held that the Doyle error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.2'27
 The district court found that the State's evidence of guilt was
not overwhelming. 228
 In addition, the court noted that the State's
213 Brecht, 113 S. CL at 1714-15.
219 Id. at 1715. During closing argument, the State urged the jury to "remember that Mr.
Brecht never volunteered until in this courtroom what happened in the Hartman residence.. .."
Id. at 1715 n.2. The State also referenced petitioner's pre-trial silence when stating, "He sits back
here and sees all of our evidence go in and then he comes out with this crazy story... ." Id. The
State further stated, "1 know what I'd say [had 1 been in petitioner's shoes], I'd say 'hold on, this
was a mistake, this was an accident, let me tell you what happened,' but he didn't say that did
he. No, he waited until he hears our story." Id.
22° Id. at 1715.
221 Id.
222 Id. (citing Wisconsin v, Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
223 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1715.
224 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Brecht, 421 N.W,2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988).
245 Id. at 1715 (citing Wisconsin v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988). The Court
grounded its assertion that the State's references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence were infrequent
on the fact that these references comprised less than two pages of a 900-page manuscript, or a
few minutes in a four-day trial in which twenty-five witnesses testified. Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Stipp. 500 (W.D. Wis. 1991)).
228 Brecht, 113 S. Ct at 1715.
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reference to petitioner's post-Miranda silence, although infrequent,
was crucial to petitioner's defense because his defense rested on his
credibility. 229 Thus, the court held that the State's error required rever-
sa l:230
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that the appropriate standard for federal habeas harm-
less error review of a Doyle error was whether the error had a "substan-
tial and injurious effect or influence" in determining the jury's verdict
under Kotteakos."' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Chapman
harmless error standard does not apply in reviewing a Doyle error on
federal habeas review because of the prophylactic nature of the Doyle
rule. 232 The court noted that the need for Doyle sterns from the implicit
assurance that flows from Miranda warnings, which are not themselves
part of the Constitution. 233 The court reasoned, therefore, that the
Doyle rule is prophylactic and is designed to protect another prophy-
lactic rule from misuse.2"4 The court concluded that Doyle is far re-
moved from protecting the innocent, and thus, does not require the
strict enforcement that the Chapman standard creates. 235 Accordingly,
the court held that the more lenient Kotteakos standard applies on
collateral enforcement of prophylactic rules. 2"6 Applying the Kotteakos
standard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that petitioner was not enti-
tled to relief. 257 The court reasoned that the petitioner failed to prove
the State's use of his post-Miranda silence had a substantial and inju-
rious effect on the jury's verdict.'" Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that
the error was harmless and reinstated the conviction. 2"
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the Seventh Circuit
by a five to four decision, held that the standard set out in Kotteakos is
the proper harmless error standard for collateral review of constitu-
2291d .
230 Id.
231 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1947)), affil, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). The Seventh Circuit also held
that a state court's decision to allow the jury to hear statements regarding petitioner's homosexu-
ality deserves deference. See id. at 1367.
232 Id. at 1370, 1374.
233 Id.
234 1d. at 1370.
235 Id. at 1374.
239
 Brecht. V. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991). The court supported the
adoption of a different standard for collateral review on the grounds that issues of finality and
federalism govern the scope of collateral review. See id. at 1372.
237 1d. at 1376.
239 Id.
239 1d.
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tional error."' The Court stated that this standard requires a finding
that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on
the jury's determination before federal habeas relief may be granted."'
In so holding, the Court adopted the same standard applied by the
Seventh Circuit, but relied on different reasoning. 242 Writing for the
majority, Chiefjustice Rehnquist followed a five-step analysis to support
the Court's holding. 243
First, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's prophylactic char-
acterization of the Doyle rule."' Instead, the Court characterized Doyle
error as a due process violation falling squarely within the trial error
categorization, and thus, amenable to constitutional harmless error
analysis."' Second, consistent with precedent, the Brecht Court assigned
itself the role of determining the appropriate harmless error standard
for federal habeas claims in the face of congressional silence. 246 Third,
the Court distinguished direct review and collateral review, 247 The Court
emphasized that it was not bound by Chapman under stare decisis since
Chapman came before the Court on direct review. 248 Fourth, using a
cost-benefit analysis, the Court determined that the Kotteakos standard
better serves the goals underlying federal habeas review of constitu-
tional trial error.24° Finally, applying the Kotteakos standard, the Court
concluded that the Doyle error in the case before it did not substantially
influence the jury's verdict. 25°
The Brecht Court began its analysis by holding that the State's
reference to petitioner's post-Miranda silence for impeachment pur-
poses was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 25 ' Rejecting the Seventh Circuit's prophylactic charac-
terization of Doyle, the Court explained that Doyle is not simply a fur-
ther extension of the Miranda prophylactic rule. 252 Rather, the Court
stated, Doyle represents a constitutional protection rooted in funda-
mental fairness arid due process concerns. 253 Accordingly, the Court
24° Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. CL 1710, 1713-14, 1722 (1993).
241 Id. at 1714, 1722.
242 /d. at 1716-17.
243 1d. 01 1713, 1717-22.
244 1d. at 1717.
245
 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
246 /d. al 1719.
247 /d. at 1719-20.
248
 See id. at 1718.
249 1d. at 1721-22.
25° Brecht, 113 S. CL at 1722.
251 1d. at 1716-17.
252 Id. at 1717.
253 Id.
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concluded that whenever the prosecution uses a defendant's post-Mi-
randa silence for impeachment purposes at trial, there exists a consti-
tutional error because due process is violated. 25' Drawing upon this
characterization, the Court asserted that Doyle error falls squarely within
the category of constitutional trial error because it involves an error
in the trial process occurring during the presentation of the case to
the jury. 255 Thus, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Brecht Court
concluded that Doyle error is a constitutional trial error and is thus
amenable to harmless error analysis under Fulminante. 256
Second, the Brecht Court asserted responsibility for determining
which harmless error standard should apply on collateral review of
constitutional error. 257 The Court rejected petitioner's argument that
the Court should construe Congress's failure to enact legislation as
legislative disapproval of a less stringent harmless error standard on
collateral review. 2" The Court reasoned that since the language of the
federal habeas statute is silent as to harmless error analysis, it is the
role of the Court to fill in the gaps as it has clone throughout history."
Thus, the Court assumed the role of determining the appropriate
standard:"
Next, in formulating this new standard, the Court distinguished
direct and collateral review. 261 The Court defined direct review as a
principal right, as distinguished from federal habeas review which the
Court described as a secondary and limited right. 262 Specifically, the
Court defined direct review as the principal avenue for challenging a
conviction, resulting in a final and legal judgment which attaches to
the conviction and sentence. 269 Conversely, the Court asserted that
federal habeas proceedings have historically been regarded as an ex-
traordinary remedy for those who have been grievously wronged. 264
Thus, the Court inferred that federal habeas review is reserved as a
proceeding of last resort.265 The Court noted that an error that may
254 Id.
255 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
256 See id.
257 1d. at 1719.
258 1d. at 1718-19.
259 Id. at 1719. The federal habeas corpus statute permits federal courts to entertain a habeas
petition on behalf of a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) (1988), and directs
the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988).
26° Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719.
261 id. at 1719-20.
262 Id. at 1719.
265 Id.
264 Id. The Court stated that it is not the role of federal courts to relitigate state trials. Id.
265 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
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justify direct appeal will not necessarily support collateral attack on a
final judgment.266 The Court justified this distinction by noting the
different standards historically applied on federal habeas review versus
direct review. 267
The Brecht Court articulated several reasons for distinguishing
direct and collateral review. 268 The Court noted the states' interest in
the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the
state court system. 269 In addition, the Court emphasized issues of fed-
eralism and comity as support for the distinction."' The Court stated
that federal intrusion through collateral attack on the states' primary
authority, interest and competency in defining and enforcing criminal
law undermines states' sovereignty and frustrates states' attempts to
preserve constitutional rights."' Finally, the Court noted that liberal
habeas availability undermines the prominence of the trial itself and
encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral
review. 272
Fourth, the Court evaluated the costs of applying the Chapman
standard on collateral review to determine which application, Chap-
man or Kotteahos, better advanced the policies underlying collateral
review?" The Court emphasized the importance of states' sovereignty." 4
The Court noted that states are completely competent and fully qualified
to identify constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect on
the trial process under Chapman. 275 Thus, in light of principles of
federalism and comity, the Court reasoned that it would be redundant
and illogical to require federal habeas courts to engage in an identical
approach to harmless error review that Chapman requires state courts
to engage in on direct review. 276 Moreover, the Court affirmatively
266
 Id. at 1720.
267 Id. For example, while new rules always have retroactive application to criminal cases on
direct review, they seldom have retroactive application to criminal cases on federal habeas review.
Id.; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (Fourth Amendment search and seizure
violations are not subject to habeas review as long as litigant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate them at state trial or on direct review); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 558-59
(1987) (Constitution guarantees right to counsel on direct review, while there is no right to
counsel on collateral review).
266
 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720-21.
262 Id, at 1720.
270 Id. at 1720,
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1720-21.
273
 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22.
274 Id. at 1721.
275
 Id. at 1721.
276 Id.
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rejected petitioner's argument that application of the Chapman harm-
less error standard on collateral review is necessary to deter state courts
from relaxing constitutional safeguards and to discourage prosecutors
from committing such errors. 277 The Court reasoned that deterrence
is not necessary because of the existing presumption of state compe-
tence and integrity.'"
The Court stated that an additional cost of applying Chapman on
collateral review is that it would undermine states' competency and
interest in finality. 279 Specifically, the Court stated that overturning final
and presumptively correct convictions on collateral review because the
state cannot prove that an error is harmless under Chapman under-
mines states' important interest in finality and infringes on state sov-
ereignty over criminal matters. 2"0 The Court further reasoned that the
Chapman standard is at odds with the limited availability of habeas
relief to litigants "grievously wronged" because Chapman mandates
relief merely because there is a "reasonable possibility" that the error
contributed to the jury's verclict. 281 Moreover, the Brecht Court iden-
tified the numerous and significant social costs associated with retrying
defendants whose convictions have been set aside. 2"2 The costs articu-
lated by the Court included expenditure of additional time and re-
sources, erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses accompanying
the passage of time which make obtaining conviction on retrial more
difficult, and frustration of societal interest in prompt and efficient
administration of justice. 2"
After identifying the costs of applying the Chapman standard, the
Brecht Court concluded that the "less onerous" Kotteakos harmless error
standard should be applied in evaluating constitutional error on col-
lateral review."' Given the overwhelming costs of applying the Chap-
man harmless error standard, the Court reasoned that the Kotteakos
standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral
review.2"5 The Court noted that it would be more likely to promote the
policies underlying federal habeas review.'" The Court further rea-
soned that the Kotteakos standard is a more appropriate standard be-
277 Id.





283 Breda, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
284 Id. at 1722.
285 /d. at 1721-22.
288 Id. at 1722.
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cause it is grounded in the federal harmless error statute and will
provide federal courts with an existing body of case law. 287 Thus, the
Brecht Court held that a defendant must prove that constitutional trial
error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" in determin-
ing the jury's verdict to warrant federal habeas relief. 288
Finally, applying the Kotteakos standard, the Brecht Court held that
the prosecution's reference to petitioner's post-Miranda silence for
impeachment purposes at trial did not substantially influence the jury's
verdict. 289
 The Court reasoned that the State's evidence of guilt was
weighty, if not overwhelming, and references to petitioner's post-Mi-
randa silence were infrequent as compared to the extensive and per-
missive references to petitioner's pre-Miranda silence. 29° Moreover, the
Court emphasized that the State presented other evidence of peti-
tioner's guilt, including motive. 29' Accordingly, the Brecht Court affir-
med the Seventh Circuit's judgment and denied petitioner habeas
relief because the Doyle error did not substantially influence the jury's
verdict. 292
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority
that the Kotteakos harmless error standard should govern collateral
review of constitutional trial error.293
 Justice Stevens wrote separately,
however, to emphasize that the Kotteakos standard does not differ
significantly from the Chapman standard and sufficiently protects liti-
gants' rights. 294
 Specifically, Justice Stevens argued that application of
either the Kotteakos or Chapman standard relies on judgment and,
therefore, these two applications do not differ significantly. 293 Although
Justice Stevens conceded that the Kotteakos standard is less stringent
than the Chapman standard, he reasoned that it is the quality of the
judgment and not the phrasing of the standard that is of significance. 296
287 Id. The federal harmless error statute provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties," 28
U.S.C. § 2111 (1988).
286 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722. The Court, however, did not preclude the possibility of habeas
relief in the absence of substantial influence on the jury's verdict in an unusual case involving a
particularly egregious trial error. Id. at 1722 n.9.
259 Id. at 1722. In lieu of remanding the case for retrial to determine whether the Doyle error
bad a substantial influence on the jury's verdict, the Brecht Court addressed the question because
the Seventh Circuit had already applied the Kotteakos standard on review. Id.
299 Id.
291
292 Id. at 1722-23.
293 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, j., concurring).
294 /d. at 1723-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
295 Id. at 1724-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
296 Id. (Stevens, j., concurring).
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Justice Stevens further emphasized that the Kotteakos standard requires
the reviewing court to evaluate the error in the context of the entire
record. 2°7 Thus, the reviewing court must. make a de novo examination
of the tria1. 298 Applying the Kotteakos standard, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that in his judgment the Doyle error that occurred at peti-
tioner's trial did not have a substantial influence in determining the
jury's verdict. 29°
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun
and Justice Souter, criticized the majority for expanding application of
the Kotteakos harmless error standard beyond Doyle error to all consti-
tutional trial error. 30° Specifically, justice White argued that because all
trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis under Fulminante and
that most constitutional errors are trial errors, the majority's holding
effectively "ousted Chapman from habeas review of state convictions.""'
Thus, Justice White noted, a state court determination that a constitu-
tional trial error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has become,
in effect, foreclosed from review by lower federal courts by way of
habeas corpus."'
Justice White further argued that habeas jurisprudence should not
be turned into a "confused patchwork" in which the same constitu-
tional right is treated differently depending on whether its vindication
is sought on direct or collateral review."' Justice White argued that
adopting the Kotteakos standard for collateral harmless error review
creates an illogical disparate treatment of constitutional error cases."'
Specifically, White explained that the new, more lenient Kotteakos stand-
ard adopted by the Brecht majority would foreclose relief if a litigant
failed to obtain relief on direct review."'
Justice White acknowledged that the application of different stand-
ards between direct and collateral review finds precedential support
only in Stone v. Powell. 306 Justice White argued, however, that the ma-
jority's holding is not supported by Stone's reasoning, because in that
case the Court's decision was premised on the nonconstitutional na-
ture of the exclusionary rule." 7 Conversely, Justice White noted, the
297 Id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring).
293 Brecht, 113 S. Ct, at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring).
299 Id. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"Id. at 1725, 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
302 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
'Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 1725 (White, J., dissenting).
3°a Id. (Whited., dissenting).
3°0 Id. at 1726 (White, J., dissenting).
397 Id. (White, J„ dissenting).
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Brecht majority explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's prophylactic
characterization of the Doyle rule, emphasizing the constitutional basis
of Doyle under due process. 308 Accordingly, Justice White criticized the
majority's holding as illogical since it created disparate standards,
preserving the Chapman standard as appropriate for constitutional
harmless error on direct review and at the same time creating a sepa-
rate standard for collateral review.308
Moreover, Justice White argued that the majority's decision is at
odds with the congressional intent that habeas review deter both prose-
cutors and courts from disregarding their constitutional responsibili-
ties.' 1 ° Specifically, Justice White reasoned that habeas review acts as a
deterrent by providing an incentive for trial and appellate courts to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with existing consti-
tutional standards.'" White disagreed with the majority's presumption
that prosecutors and courts will uphold the Constitution and perform
their duties correctly." 2
In contrast to Justice White, Justice O'Connor, in a separate dis-
senting opinion, found no fault with the majority's distinction between
collateral and direct review."' Justice O'Connor also found no fault
with the majority's application of different, more lenient standards to
resolve claims on habeas than on direct review.'" Similar to Justice
White, however, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for expand-
ing the Kotteakos harmless error standard to all trial errors." She stated
that restraint should be the controlling factor when the Court makes
decisions regarding the writ of habeas corpus due to its nature as a
fundamental safeguard against unlawful custody." Moreover, Justice
O'Connor stated that she was not convinced that federalism, finality
and fairness counseled against applying Chapman uniformly." 7 Conse-
quently, Justice O'Connor asserted that she would continue to apply
Chapman on direct and collateral review. 318
Supporting her opinion to maintain the Chapman standard, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the Kotteakos standard failed to provide the
308 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1726-27 (White, J., dissenting).
3119 See id. at 1727-28 (White, J., dissenting).
510 Id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
311 See id. (White, J., dissenting).
312 /d. (White, J., dissenting).
313 BreCht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
31 '1 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313 1d. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
-.516 Id. at 1728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
317 1d. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
318 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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same assurance of reliability as Chapman."' She explained that under
the more lenient Kotteakos standard, the Court increases the likelihood
that a conviction will be preserved despite an error that actually af-
fected the reliability of the trial."" Justice O'Connor reasoned that
since the Kotteakos standard is more lenient than Chapman, the burden
to prove harmless error is lower, and thus, there is a greater probability
that an error with the potential to undermine verdict accuracy will be
declared harmless."' In such a case, Justice O'Connor argued, prison-
ers have been grievously wronged and ought not bear the greater risk
of uncertainty that the majority imposes on them by its holding. 322
Moreover, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's comment in
footnote nine, which leaves open the possibility of applying the Chap-
man standard in unusual cases, will cause prisoners to plead their cases
under this exception. 323 Justice O'Connor acknowledged, however, that
since the Court reserves only the possibility of an exception, parties
must address whether there exists an exception at all. 324
Finally, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's cost-benefit analy-
sis."' She argued that, contrary to the majority's assertion, the Kotteakos
standard will increase litigation and simultaneously decrease elficiency. 32"
Specifically, she noted that the majority's potential narrow exception
will inspire prisoners to argue both that the exception exists and that
their cases fall within its parameters. 327 Further, Justice O'Connor as-
serted that the majority failed to demonstrate that the Kotteakos stand-
ard will minimize social costs and ease the burden of conducting
harmless error review. 328 She noted that while Kotteakos is somewhat
more lenient than the Chapman standard and may permit more errors
to pass uncorrected, it merely reduces the number of cases in which
relief will be granted and does not decrease the burden of identifying
those cases that warrant such relief."'
319 hi, at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued for application of the
Chapman standard because it provides reliability. Id. at 1729-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Specifically, she argues that proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt sufficiently restores
confidence in the verdict's reliability so that the conviction may stand despite the error. Id. at
1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32° Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
321 See id. al 1729-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322 1d. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
323 RIWChl, 113 S. Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
324 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
325 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
327 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325 Breehl, 113 S. Ct. at 1731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that the Kotieakos
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V. COMMENTATORS' CRITICISMS OF THE BRECHT DECISION
In August, 1993, the National Law Journal described the Brecht
decision as the "most significant" of the Supreme Court's 1993 deci-
sions involving the structure of federal habeas corpus proceedings."°
Thus, it is not surprising that the Brecht decision aroused significant
attention and opposition in the legal community."' Commentators'
primary criticisms consist of four arguments: (1) the Brecht decision
represents further evisceration of habeas corpus; 832 (2) the Brecht deci-
sion requires a showing of actual prejudice and shifts the burden of
proofi3" (3) the Brecht decision contributes to judicial waste: 84 and (4)
the Brecht decision opens the door to constitutional tnischief." 5 These
four arguments fault the Brecht majority for adopting the Kotteakos
standard on habeas review by focusing on the negative effects of the
decision."6 Thus, commentators' criticisms of the Brecht decision are
primarily outcome-oriented. 337 The first three of these arguments, how-
ever, focus on the impact of Brecht on habeas review. 38 In contrast, the
fourth argument focuses on the effect Brecht may have on direct review
proceedings."'
A. Evisceration of Habeas Corpus Argument
Some commentators assert that the Brecht Court's holding reflects
another step toward evisceration of habeas corpus. 84° Specifically, these
commentators predict that adoption of the "watered-down" Kotteakos
harmless error standard on habeas review makes it more difficult for
a petition of habeas corpus to be granted upon a constitutional error. 84 '
standard is unlikely to lighten the load on the federal judiciary, because under Kotteahos, the
courts must still review the entire record, conduct their review de novo, and decide whether they
have sufficient confidence that the verdict would have remained unchanged even if the error
had not occurred. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Eric M. Freedman, Tinkering- with the Machinery in Capital Cases, NAT' L	 Aug. 23,1993,
Supp. 12.
331 See, e.g., Spickler, supra note 10; Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term: The Court's
Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and Starts, N.Y. Thus, July 4,1993, § 4, at I; Seiberg, supra note
119.
3" See infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text
333 See infra notes 346-56 and accompanying text
334 See infra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
335 See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
336 See infra notes 340-69 and accompanying text
"7 See infra notes 340-69 and accompanying text.
338 See infra notes 340-61 and accompanying text
3" See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
340 Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50,572; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 307.
341 Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 307.
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At least one commentator describes this alleged effect as unsurprising
in light of the Supreme Court's trend toward diluting the harmless
error standard as a means to eviscerate habeas corpus.'" Commenta-
tors' concern focuses primarily on what they argue is a loss to individ-
ual rights.'" Opponents criticize the Brecht majority for failing to abate
judicial efficiency problems underlying habeas corpus review as the
Court intended, and argue instead, the decision severely undermines
individual constitutional rights protected by traditional habeas review. 344
Thus, this argument views the Brecht decision as a limit on federal
habeas review accessibility and as a loss to constitutional rights. 345
B. Actual Prejudice and Burden-Shifting Argument
Supplementing the concern that Brecht limits accessibility to ha-
beas review, some commentators predict an impact on the granting of
habeas relief because of the burden Brecht places on habeas petition-
ers.34" This criticism is expressed in two distinct interpretations of the
Brecht decision."" One interpretation is that the Brecht decision re-
quires a showing of actual prejudice before an error may be considered
harmless.'" The second interpretation construes Brecht as shifting the
burden of proving harmless error to the petitioner.")
Commentators argue that the Brecht decision requires a showing
of "actual prejudice" before an error may be considered harmful.'"
They draw this conclusion from Chief Justice Rehnquist's language in
Brecht where he states that "Lhiabeas petitioners may obtain plenary
review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas
relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in
`actual prejudice.''35'' Thus, commentators argue that the standard
adopted by the Brecht Court is even more lenient than "substantial and
342 Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50,573.
"3 See Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50,573-74; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 307,
Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50, 573; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 307.
346 See Spickler, supra note 10, at 549-50, 573-74; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 307,
346 See j, Thomas Sullivan, A Practical Guide to Recent Developments in Federal Habeas Corpus
for Practicing Attorneys, 25 Autz. ST. U. 317,346 (1993); GREENHOUSE, supra note 331; Seiberg,
supra note 119.
"7 See Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346-47; Greenhouse, supra note 331; Seiberg, supra note
119.
3411 Suilivan, supra note 346, at 346; Seiberg, supra note 119.
949 See Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Greenhouse, supra note 331,
330 Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Seiberg, supra note 119.
"I Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710,1722 (1993).
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injurious effect or influence," and in effect, requires "actual preju-
dice. "352
Other commentators similarly emphasize the burden imposed on
the habeas petitioner by the Brecht decision."' They assert that the
Brecht decision shifts the burden of proving harmless error from the
state to the petitioner. 354
 These commentators assert that the Brecht
decision not only raises the threshold standard of demonstrating harm-
less error, but forces this burden on the habeas petitioner."' At least
one commentator characterizes this shift in the burden of proof as a
defeat to state prisoners. 356
C. judicial Waste Argument
Another outcome-oriented argument advanced by at least one
Brecht opponent is that the "watering-down" of the harmless error
standard on collateral review will contribute to judicial waste." 57
 Spe-
cifically, she predicts that while the number of habeas cases will de-
crease, direct appeals occurring prior to a petition for writ of habeas
corpus will remain.358
 Thus, she asserts that the Brecht decision will not
promote judicial efficiency, but will only create more waste. 359 Addition-
ally, she argues that federal courts will continue to be backlogged on
collateral review, because although the Kotteakos standard is more lenient,
federal courts are still required to review the entire record de novo.36°
Consequently, this opponent asserts that the Brecht majority failed to
alleviate efficiency problems of habeas review as intended, and merely
exacerbated the problem of judicial waste. 36 '
D. Open Door Argument
In contrast to the evisceration, actual prejudice/burden-shifting
and judicial waste arguments, some commentators criticize the Brecht
353 See Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Seiberg, supra note 119.
353 Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Greenhouse, supra note 331.
354 Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Greenhouse, supra note 331.
355 See Sullivan, supra note 346, at 346; Greenhouse, supra note 331. These commentators
apparently rely on Chiegustice Rehnquist's dicta that Ihlabeas petitioners ... arc not entitled
to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.'"
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
356 Greenhouse, supra note 331.
3t7 Spickler, supra note 10, at 572.
358 Id.
356 Id. at 572-73.
srAt
361 Id.
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decision because of its potential effect on direct review proceedings.''''
Specifically, some commentators argue that by introducing an entirely
new standard of review for federal habeas cases, Brecht "opens the door
to constitutional mischief "363 These scholars predict that lowering the
harmless error standard on habeas review will encourage prosecutors
to introduce questionable evidence at trial and attempt to implement
the Kotteakos harmless error standard on direct appeal if their actions
are challenged.s14 Thus, opponents anticipate that the Brecht decision
will reach beyond the confines of habeas corpus proceedings and will
ultimately govern harmless error analysis on direct review as well. 5
Thus, although recent, the Brecht decision has aroused consider-
able attention and opposition in the legal community.' 66 Commenta-
tors who assert evisceration and actual prejudice/burden-shifting argu-
ments focus primarily on the effect Brecht will have on habeas petitioners
themselves. 3"7 Others, who argue that Brecht will cause judicial waste,
emphasize that the Court's reasoning is inconsistent with the actual
effect of Brecht.'" Finally, commentators who assert the "open door"
argument express concern over the potential overreaching nature of
Brecht. 369
VI. THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW AFTER BRECHT V.
ABRAHAMSON
Although commentators' criticisms of the Brecht decision appear
facially valid, a careful reading of the Brecht decision indicates many of
these criticisms are without merit. While the Brecht majority advanced
reasons for adopting the Kotteakos standard of harmless error which
do not necessarily flow from the Brecht decision, the Court's remaining
arguments for its decision are sound and prudent. Both the Brecht
majority's reasoning and United States Supreme Court precedent re-
fute the validity of commentators' criticism of the Brecht decision.
362 William J. Greenhalgh & Jennifer A. DeMarrais, Criminal Law in a Staff? of Flux, N.J. L.J.,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 21.
363 Greenhalgh & DeMarrais, supra note 362.
364 Id.
8651d.
366 See supra notes 340-65 and accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 340-56 and accompanying text
368 See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text
369 See supra notes 362-68 and accompanying text
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A. Brecht Distinguishes Direct and Collateral Review Policies
Commentators' characterization of the Brecht decision as an "evis-
ceration of habeas corpus" fails to acknowledge the distinction be-
tween direct and collateral proceedings."° As the Brecht Court stated,
principles of comity and finality underlie habeas review and thus,
are quite distinct from direct review principles."' Contrary to Justice
White's assertions, this distinction is not new to American jurispru-
dence.372 For example, in Stone v. Powell and Teague v. Lane, the United
States Supreme Court specifically noted the differing purposes of di-
rect and collateral review."' Because of this distinction, it is illogical
and a waste of judicial resources, as the Brecht Court noted, to employ
the same test on both direct and collateral review.
Additionally, applying the same test on direct and collateral review
inherently questions the competence of state courts to preserve con-
stitutional rights. Employing the same standard on direct and collateral
review allows federal courts to freely intrude on states' authority to
define and enforce criminal law. This intrusion frustrates principles of
federalism and comity. In contrast, employing the Kotteakos standard
on habeas review promotes, rather than frustrates, the principles un-
derlying habeas review. Specifically, use of the less stringent Kotteakos
standard recognizes habeas review as a secondary and limited right and
acknowledges state competence in vindicating and preserving consti-
tutional rights.
The Kotteakos standard raises the threshold for habeas relief from
that required under Chapman, which is consistent with the goal of
preserving final judgments that survive direct review within the state
court system. Because habeas petitioners have full opportunity to ex-
haust state review remedies, it is appropriate to impose a less stringent
standard in habeas cases of constitutional error to promote finality of
judgments. Thus, the Brecht decision does not eviscerate habeas corpus
or individual rights, but rather, appropriately reflects the extreme and
limited nature of habeas review.
B. Commentators' Misreadings of the Brecht Decision
While the evisceration argument fails to acknowledge the distinc-
tion between direct and collateral proceedings, this argument, as well
as the actual prejudice/burden-shifting arguments, also reflects a mis-
37° See supra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
" Brecht v. Abrahmson, 113 S. Ct 1710,1720-21 (1993).
372 See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text,
"3 E.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,305-06 (1989).
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reading of the Brecht decision. Specifically, these arguments seemingly
reflect commentators' knee-jerk reaction to the decision and its poten-
tial impact on individual rights. These arguments, however, predict
injuries to habeas petitioners that do not flow from the Brecht decision.
First, commentators' arguments that the Kotteakos harmless error
standard limits accessibility of habeas review of constitutional error
lack merit.'74 While the Brecht Court's decision imposes a less stringent
standard on habeas review of constitutional error, it does nothing to
limit accessibility.375 In fact, accessibility is the one issue on which the
Brecht majority's reasoning fails. Specifically, the Brecht majority rea-
soned that the Kotteakos standard eases the burden imposed on the
judicial system from habeas review. 376 This reasoning implies that fewer
habeas petitions on constitutional error will be granted after Brecht.
The Brecht decision, however, does not impact whether a petition for
habeas review on constitutional error will be granted; rather, the deci-
sion impacts whether habeas relief should be awarded. Thus, post-
Brecht accessibility of habeas review remains unchanged.
While accessibility remains unchanged, the number of habeas
petitions on constitutional error may, in fact, decline as a result of
Brecht. Specifically, the Brecht decision may act as a deterrent for raising
frivolous constitutional error claims. Because the Kotteakos standard is
less stringent, i.e., it requires a lower standard of proof to establish
harmless error than under Chapman, petitioners may be daunted from
proceeding to habeas review after direct review proceedings have been
exhausted and unsuccessful. In other words, if a petitioner fails on
direct review to show harmful error under Chapman, he or she may be
dissuaded from seeking habeas review under the less stringent Kot-
teakos standard. Thus, the Brecht majority's prediction that applying the
Kotteakos standard on habeas review will ease judicial burdens may be
correct given the potential deterrent effect of the Brecht decision.
Similar to the limited accessibility argument, commentators' sug-
gestion that the Brecht holding requires that a habeas petitioner make
a showing of "actual prejudice" is inconsistent with the Brecht opin-
ions" In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[h]abeas
petitioners ... are not entitled to relief based on trial error unless they
can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice,'""' using the term
"actual prejudice" as a term of art, rather than an actual standard. The
374 See supra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
375
 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
376 See id. at 1721, 1722.
377 See supra notes 346-56 and accompanying text.
378 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
1140	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:1105
Brecht Court specifically held that the Kotteakos harmless error standard
should apply on habeas review of constitutional error." This standard
requires a showing of "substantial and injurious effect or influence" to
overturn a conviction."° Thus, something less than actual prejudice is
required.
Finally, the argument that Brecht requires a habeas petitioner to
assume the burden of proving substantial injury is not entirely accu-
rate."' In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in dicta that
habeas petitioners are "not entitled to relief unless they can establish
that [the trial error] resulted in 'actual prejudice."'-' 82 While this dicta
is persuasive, it is not positive law and does not specifically address to
whom the burden of proof should be allocated.
Further, the Brecht majority specifically held that Kotteakos harm-
less error analysis would apply on habeas review of constitutional error. 383
Referring back to the Kotteakos decision reveals that the appropriate
burden for constitutional harmless error analysis rests with the state."'
Specifically, in Kotteakos the Court stated that the burden of proving a
harmful technical error rests with the party asserting the error. 5 In
contrast, the Kotteakos Court stated that the beneficiary of the error
bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless where the
error affects the substantial rights of the litigant." 6 Because constitu-
tional error would never fall within the scope of "technical" error, the
state bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness under Kotteakos.
Thus, interpreting the Brecht Court's ambiguous burden of proof dicta
in light of Kotteakos requires the state to bear the burden of proving
constitutional harmless error. Accordingly, lower courts will likely im-
pose the burden of proof on the state.
Thus, several commentators advanced arguments which reflect a
misreading of Brecht and predict consequences that realistically do not
flow from the decision. While concern for habeas petitioners' rights
underlies these arguments, a careful analysis of the Brecht decision
indicates habeas petitioners' burden after Brecht is more modest than
these opponents suggest. Accordingly, the Brecht decision has less of
an impact than commentators predict.
579 Id.
38° Id.
38L See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
3m Brecht, 113 S. CL at 1722.
3" Id.
3M4 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946).
385 Id.
mi
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C. The Limited Impact of Brecht on Habeas Petitioners
While Brecht will likely result in habeas petitioners losing some
cases that they previously would have won, the impact of the Brecht
decision on habeas corpus and individual rights is more limited than
commentators predict. Recent case law supports this modest impact. 387
Specifically, federal cases applying Kotteakos harmless error analysis to
nonconstitutional error illustrate that defendants enjoy a substantial
degree of success in satisfying the "substantial and injurious effect or
influence" test."' Post-Brecht constitutional error cases suggest that the
same pattern will continue. 389
 Moreover, the Brecht majority limited its
holding to trial-type errors, as opposed to structural errors considered
so fundamental to the fairness of the trial that reversal is automatic.'"
Recent additions to the non-exclusive list of structural errors announced
in Fulminante indicate that structural errors will conceivably overwhelm
in number and importance those that will be defined as trial errors."'
Moreover, in footnote nine of the Brecht opinion, the Court left
open the possibility of a narrow exception to Brecht in cases of particu-
larly egregious error. 392
 In such cases, the Court noted that habeas
relief may be granted even if the error did not substantially influence
the jury's verdict.'" While the Court only left open the possibility of
such an exception, footnote nine offers an additional vehicle for po-
tential relief.
382 See, e.g., Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213, 214 (6th Cir. 1993) (Confrontation Clause
violation that occurred when deposition testimony was admitted in lieu of live testimony was not
harmless error under Kotteakos); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 717, 725 (11th Cir. 1993)
(state court's erroneous allowing of five-year-old victim to testify before television camera outside
of courtroom was not harmless error under Kotteakos),
388 See, e.g., United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1427 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1993) (trial court's
error in admitting co-conspirator's hearsay statement that he owed his source $2,000 for purchase
of two ounces of cocaine was not harmless error under Kotteakos); United States v. Morris, 988
F.2d 1335, 1337, 1343 (4th Cir. 1993) (error in allowing prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's
wife regarding her prior assertion of marital privilege in declining to testify before grand jury
was not harmless error under Kotiealios); United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 909 (2d Cir.
1993) (erroneous admission of other act evidence was not harmless error under Kotteakos in
prosecution for conspiring to import cocaine).
389
 See, e.g., Stoner, 997 F.2d at 213, 214 (Confrontation Clause violation that occurred when
deposition testimony was admitted in lieu of live testimony was not harmless error under Kot-
teakos); Curable, 991 F.2d. at 717, 725 (state court's erroneous allowing of five-year-old victim to
testily before television camera outside of courtroom was not harmless error under Kotteakos).
399
 Brecht v. Ahrahmson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717, 1722 (1993).
991 For example, in 1993, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court added
constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instructions to its non-exclusive list of structural er-
rors. 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080, 2082-83 (1993).
392 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 n.9.
m9.,s
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D. The Limited Impact of Brecht on Habeas Courts
Similar to the limited impact of Brecht on habeas petitioners, it
provides a moderate impact on habeas proceedings as well. Because
Brecht does not affect accessibility to habeas review, the decision will
likely only contribute modest relief to habeas courts. It will not, how-
ever, increase judicial waste as at least one commentator predicts."' As
this commentator argues, Brecht will not affect the number of direct
appeals, nor was it intended to have such an effect. Thus, Brecht does
not foster greater judicial waste; rather, Brecht, at the very least, main-
tains the status quo. Furthermore, the Brecht decision may actually
relieve habeas courts' dockets by acting to deter frivolous habeas peti-
tions. Nevertheless, even if the Brecht decision merely maintains the
status quo, the other pragmatic and policy reasons for the decision
discussed previously support the veracity of the Brecht decision.
Moreover, the narrow exception in footnote nine seems more
consistent with the overall reasoning of the Brecht majority when viewed
in light of Brecht's policy considerations, rather than under a judicial
efficiency perspective. As Justice O'Connor argued, footnote nine leaves
the door open to increased litigation because petitioners must prove
both that an exception exists and that their case falls within its parame-
ters. 395 In other words, a petitioner must argue that even if a trial error
did not substantially influence the jury's verdict, habeas relief is re-
quired because of the unusually egregious nature of the error. Addi-
tionally, the petitioner must prove that the constitutional error at his
or her trial is such an error. Thus, the litigation is made increasingly
complicated and time consuming. From an efficiency perspective, as
Justice O'Connor asserted, this exception is unsupported." 6 In con-
trast, however, the exception is wholly consistent with the Brecht major-
ity's attempt to adopt a harmless error standard that both advances the
policies underlying collateral review and protects individuals' constitu-
tional rights. t97
Thus, in general, the consequences of the Brecht decision on
habeas petitioners and habeas courts are much more limited than
commentators predict. After Brecht, a litigant has full opportunity to
appeal a conviction through direct proceedings and has full access to
habeas review if direct proceedings are exhausted. Further, a litigant
who is grievously wronged will still obtain relief under Brecht.
"See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
395 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
396 Id. (O'Connor,,)., dissenting).
997 Brecht, 113 S. Gt. at 1722.
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E. Direct Review Proceedings After Brecht
While Brecht has only a modest impact on habeas petitioners and
habeas courts, it has relatively no effect on direct proceedings. Thus,
commentators' argument that Brecht "opens the door to constitutional
mischief" by introducing an entirely new standard of review on federal
habeas cases is completely unjustified." The Brecht majority adopted
the Kotteakos standard for habeas corpus cases because it better ad-
vanced the policies underlying habeas review."' The Court acknow-
ledged in Brecht that the Chapman standard continues to apply on
direct review because direct review is different from collateral review.-0 °0
Nowhere in the Brecht decision did the Court intimate that the stand-
ard on direct review of constitutional error should change. Thus,
commentators' predictions that the Brecht decision will ultimately gov-
ern harmless error on direct review have no basis and lack support.
F. Brecht Reflects Society's Demand for Finality
Finally, the Brecht decision reflects society's desperate attempt to
preserve the finality of judgments. As the amount of crime in this
country increases, people are becoming increasingly concerned with
ensuring that crimes do not go unpunished and that criminals are not
free to harm other victims. 101 The Brecht decision, in effect, reflects this
concern by raising the threshold for relief after state remedies have
been exhausted. The decision, however, does not place an undue
burden on a litigant, but rather, balances the costs to society in over-
turning a conviction against a litigant's individual rights. After .Brecht,
a litigant has full opportunity to appeal a conviction through direct
proceedings and has full access to habeas review if direct proceedings
are exhausted. Further, a litigant who is grievously wronged will still
obtain relief under Brecht; while the litigant with a frivolous claim will
not. Thus, the Brecht decision does not give precedence to society's
interest in ensuring verdicts are not overruled. Rather, the decision
reflects societal concerns, while fully protecting a litigant's individual
rights.
398 See supra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
399 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
400 1d. at 171718 (Brecht Court narrowly decided proper standard on habeas review and left
Chapman harmless error to govern direct review).
4mSpickler, supra note 10, at 549.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the United States Supreme Court
held that federal habeas relief may only be granted where constitu-
tional error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." 402 1n so holding, the Court adopted the
Kotteakos standard for harmless error on collateral review and pre-
served the Chapman harmless error standard for direct review. 4" While
commentators predict a significant loss to habeas petitioners as a result
of the Brecht decision, a careful analysis of this decision reveals that its
impact is only modest.404
 Furthermore, the decision reflects society's
and states' demand for finality of judgments by raising the threshold
for proving an error harmful after exhausting direct review proceed-
ings. The decision does not, however, give precedence to society's and
states' concerns. Rather, the Brecht decision balances these concerns
with the equally important concern over protecting litigants' individual
rights. Thus, a litigant advancing a meritorius claim will still obtain
relief, while the litigant with a frivolous claim will not.
ROBIN A. COLOMBO
402 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
4°3 See id. at 1721-22.
494 See infra notes 340-56 and accompanying text.
